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TEE and Confidential Computing

Mengyuan Li's research on Trusted Execution Environments (TEE) and confidential computing spans four closely related areas: TEE-based systems and performance optimization, attacks on confidential computing platforms, defenses for secure cloud and AI infrastructure, and more general cloud security. This includes work on AMD SEV and SEV-SNP, SGX, confidential VMs, confidential GPU systems, ciphertext side channels, virtualization, secure networking, serverless platforms, and high-performance confidential workloads.

Related searches this page is designed to serve: TEE, Trusted Execution Environment, confidential computing, TEE-based systems, TEE performance optimization, TEE attacks, TEE defenses, confidential VM, AMD SEV, SEV-SNP, SGX, cloud GPU security, cloud security, serverless security.

TEE-Based Systems and Performance Optimization

MC-ORAM: A Mask-Assisted and Counter-Based Non-Deterministic ORAM Inside VM-Based TEEs
ISCA 2026

Explores secure memory techniques for VM-based TEEs and efficient protected execution.

HPCA 2026

Connects confidential computing with efficient multi-GPU machine learning and shows how to reduce system bottlenecks in trusted infrastructure.

IEEE S&P 2022

Bridges virtualization and enclave protection across TEE platforms, highlighting system support for deployable trusted execution.

Under Submission

Explores how to support elastic confidential VMs with secure and dynamic CPU scaling, improving the flexibility and efficiency of TEE-based systems.

Under Submission

Studies how to improve networking performance for confidential VMs without relying on trusted I/O devices, targeting practical system optimization in confidential cloud settings.

Attacks on TEE and Confidential Computing Platforms

IEEE S&P 2022

Studies side-channel vulnerabilities that break confidentiality guarantees in encrypted and confidential execution settings.

HASP 2025

Examines subtle security implications of RMP entry caching in SEV-SNP and expands the attack surface analysis of modern confidential computing platforms.

USENIX Security 2021

Shows how ciphertext side channels can break constant-time cryptographic implementations running inside AMD SEV.

DIMVA 2023

Demonstrates a side-channel attack surface exposed by the power reporting interface in AMD SEV platforms.

ACSAC 2021

Uncovers a microarchitectural attack that breaks isolation assumptions in AMD SEV through TLB manipulation.

CCS 2021

Shows how crash-based isolation assumptions can fail in AMD SEV and lead to cross-boundary memory exposure.

USENIX Security 2019

Studies attacks that exploit unprotected I/O operations in AMD SEV, highlighting early weaknesses in confidential VM designs.

IEEE DSC 2019

Addresses speculative-execution threats in SGX and reflects broader work on attack surfaces and mitigation around TEE platforms.

Defense and Design Guidance

ASIACCS 2024

A systems-oriented overview of TEE design tradeoffs and common pitfalls, useful for understanding how to build more secure confidential computing systems.

USENIX Security 2023 and related publications

Focuses on detecting vulnerabilities and deriving stronger design and implementation guidance for secure cryptographic and confidential systems.

General Cloud Security

USENIX ATC 2018

Studies security and isolation properties of serverless platforms, representing broader cloud security work beyond TEE-specific mechanisms.

Related teaching and systems-security context

This broader line of work also connects to cloud multi-tenancy, isolation failures, and shared-infrastructure threats that matter beyond confidential computing alone.

Teaching and Lab Context

CSCI 699: Confidential Computing covers trusted execution environments, confidential virtual machines, confidential GPUs, and privacy-preserving computation. The SEPT Lab page provides the broader lab context for this research area.

Related Pages

For adjacent research directions, see Verifiable AI and AI Agent Security. The full publication list is available on the homepage publications section.